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Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics
in games with complementarities and
no aggregate risk∗




We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class
of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and
strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept,
calledMarkov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove
its existence, and determine comparative statics of equilibrium paths and
the steady state invariant distributions to which they converge. Finally, we
provide numerous applications of our results including: dynamic models
of growth with status concerns, social distance, and paternalistic bequest
with endogenous preference for consumption.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a constructive method for characterizing and approximating
Markovian equilibria in a class of dynamic games with a continuum of players
and strategic complementarities. Each player is endowed with a private type
that evolves stochastically over time. The type may be interpreted as the agent’s
endowment, social rank, payoff-relevant private information, behavioral traits,
etc., depending on the economic application at hand. An equilibrium is defined
as a probability distribution over types and actions of all players in the initial
period, and a law of motion/belief regarding future distributions of types and
actions in the population. Our approach allows for a unified study of both the
equilibrium transition paths and the equilibrium comparative dynamics from any
initial state of the game, as well as the associated long-run stochastic steady state
(i.e., invariant distributions) to which these equilibrium paths converge.
Large dynamic games with private information find numerous applications in
diverse fields in economics, including models of equilibrium growth with hetero-
geneous agents and endogenous social structure (Cole et al., 1992), inequality
with endogenous preference formation (Genicot and Ray, 2017), industry dynam-
ics with heterogeneous firms (Weintraub et al., 2008), dynamic network forma-
tion (Mele, 2017; Xu, 2018), economics of identity and social dissonance (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000; Bisin et al., 2011), models of endogenous formation of social
norms (Acemoglu and Jackson, 2017), macroeconomic models with public or pri-
vate sunspots (Angeletos and Lian, 2016), or models of wealth distribution in the
presence of incomplete markets (Cao, 2020).1 The principal objective of these pa-
pers is to provide sufficient conditions for existence, characterization, computation,
calibration, and estimation of dynamic equilibria. However, the existing tools are
1 See also Acemoglu and Jensen (2015, 2018) for a discussion on the relation between large
dynamic economies and large anonymous games.
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typically applicable only to the study of stochastic steady-state equilibria defied
in terms of invariant distributions. In contrast, we provide a systematic method
for studying global equilibrium distributional transitional paths that converge to
the stochastic steady-states.
The theoretical literature on equilibrium dynamics in games is quite limited,
even in the context of games with finitely many players.2 This is because charac-
terizing the dynamics of sequential or Markovian equilibria becomes analytically
intractable as the number of players grows and the state space becomes large and
complex. Additionally, due to heterogeneity of private types, determining how
players update their beliefs both ’on’ and ’off’ equilibrium paths is non-trivial.
Even providing sufficient conditions for existence of sequential equilibria is chal-
lenging, let alone providing methods for approximating and characterizing the
evolution of types an actions over time.
Due to these complications, the literature has focused on equilibrium concepts
that simplify dynamic interactions. Two dominant methodological approaches
have been proposed in the existing literature. One exploits aggregative structures
in games and restricts players’ interactions to a statistic or an aggregate that
summarizes the population distribution, joint with some notion of a stochastic
steady-state equilibrium. The other (often used in conjunction with aggregation
and restriction to steady-states) simplifies equilibrium interactions by imposing
behavioral assumptions on how agents make their decisions. This includes the
recent work on oblivious equilibria (Lasry and Lions, 2007, Achdou et al., 2014,
Bertucci et al., 2018, Light and Weintraub, 2019, Achdou et al., 2020), mean-field
equilibria (Weintraub et al., 2008, Adlakha et al., 2015, and Ifrach and Weintraub,
2016), or imagined-continuum equilibria (Kalai and Shmaya, 2018), among oth-
ers.3 We argue that such simplifications are not critical or necessary in games
2 From the theoretical perspective, little is known about the nature of convergence of equi-
librium transitional dynamics to stochastic steady-states. This question is complicated by the
presence of equilibrium multiplicities and stability issues related to equilibrium transitional
paths, thus, making the counterfactuals from these models difficult to implement and interpret.
3 See also Krusell and Smith (1998) where agents know only the moments of the random
measure determining the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks and assets. See also Doncel et al.
(2016); Kwok (2019); Lacker (2020); Nutz (2018).
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with strategic complementarities.
Our results This paper tackles the above theoretical and computational ques-
tions within a unified methodological framework of large anonymous stochastic
games with strategic complementarities4 and no aggregate risk.5 Exploiting the
nature of games with infinitely many agents, where individuals have negligible
impact on actions of others, and in the context of games with strategic comple-
mentarities, we provide sufficient conditions for existence of a Markov stationary
Nash distributional equilibrium (henceforth MSNDE). Our solution concept con-
sists of a probability measure over types and actions in the population of players
and a law of motion that determines the equilibrium evolution of such distribu-
tions. MSNDE is defined over a minimal set of state variables6 and resembles the
notion of recursive competitive equilibrium that is extensively used in macroeco-
nomics. Our equilibrium concept is therefore inherently dynamic and enables us
to characterize and compare equilibrium transition paths. Notably, the results
hold without the need of restricting our analysis to an aggregative structure. In
fact, in our economic applications, players’ payoffs critically depend on the entire
distribution of types and actions in the population.7
Limiting our attention to games with strategic complementarities is indis-
pensable for our results. First of all, it allows us to formulate the evolution of
(distributional) equilibrium beliefs in a tracktable way. Second, we develop a new
order-theoretic approach to characterize the order structure of (Markovian) Nash
distributional equilibria. This enables us to prove existence of the greatest and
the least MSNDE (with respect to a well-defined stochastic order). Third, by
analyzing a measure space of agents, we avoid the technical difficulties that can
4 See Topkis (1978), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Veinott (1992) and Milgrom
and Shannon (1994) for early contributions and motivations for studying games with strategic
complementarities. See also van Zandt and Vives (2007) and Van Zandt (2010) for Bayesian
games with strategic complementarities and finitely many players.
5 See Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988), Bergin and Bernhardt (1992); Karatzas et al. (1994).
6 By the minimal state space, we mean a domain that includes only the current individual
type and the distribution of types in the population.
7 Equilibrium distributions are also important in econometric evaluation of heterogeneous
agents in macroeconomics. See, e.g., Parra-Alvarez et al. (2017) and Auclert et al. (2019).
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emerge in extensive-form supermodular games with a finite number of players and
private information.8 Finally, our approach delivers novel results in construct-
ing global equilibrium comparative statics/dynamics that apply to monotone dy-
namic economies. This way, we extend the recent results on comparative statics
of stochastic steady-state equilibria as in Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) and Light
and Weintraub (2019).
We organize the paper as follows. In the remainder of this section, we present
a motivating example to discuss the main issues that we tackle in our results. In
Section 2 we present the main model and prove equilibrium existence. The results
on monotone comparative statics/dynamics are discussed in Section 3. We present
economic applications of our results in Section 4. Proofs, auxiliary results, and a
glossary of mathematical terminology are postponed until the appendix.
A motivating example Consider a growth model in which individuals are
concerned with their relative social status. The society consists of a continuum
of players. Each time period n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, a typical player is endowed with
a (private) wealth/capital level t ∈ T = [0, 1] that constitutes their type. This
wealth can be transformed into consumption c ∈ [0, 1] or investment a ∈ A = [0, 1]
using a one-to-one technology, thus, introducing the constraint t = c + a. By
investing a ∈ [0, t], the agent influences their wealth t′ in the following period
via a stochastic technology q. Whenever a units of wealth is being invested, the
cumulative probability of attaining the capital t′ is q(t′|a). We assume that higher
investments make higher wealth more likely, i.e., the distribution q(·|a) increases
in a with respect to the first order stochastic dominance. Finally, we assume that
the realization of the future capital t′ is independent across players. The discount
factor, common to all players, is denoted by β ∈ (0, 1).
The status of each agent is determined by both their current consumption c and
wealth t. In each period, every individual interacts randomly with one other mem-
ber of the society. If an agent with capital t consuming c encounters an individual
of wealth t̃ consuming c̃, the former receives U(c, c̃, t, t̃) = m(t− t̃) + w(c− c̃),
8 See Echenique (2004), Vives (2009), and Mensch (2020) for a related discussion.
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where the functions m and w are continuous, strictly increasing, and concave.
Thus, interacting with individuals with lower wealth and consumption is prefer-
able due to, say, the feeling of superiority.
At the beginning of each period, i.e., before any interaction with other members
takes place, the individual determines their consumption c and investment a. In
order to do so, first they evaluate their beliefs about the current distribution µ
over capital-investments pairs (t̃, ã) in the population, where ã = t̃ − c̃. Given a
belief µ, their expected payoff in that particular period is given by:




m(t− t̃) + w(t− a− t̃ + ã)
]
µ(dã× dt̃).
Importantly, payoffs of players depend on the entire distribution of type-actions
in the population. Thus, this game is inherently non-aggregative. Indeed, evalu-
ating payoff in each period requires the entire distribution µ of capital (types) and
investments (actions) in the population. Simply replacing the measure µ with a
summary statistic is not enough to define the payoffs.
We are interested in studying the dynamic distributional equilibrium of this
game. More generally, we investigate how the distributions of types and actions
in the population evolve and interact when (a) the evolution of types and actions
is determined by strategies of individuals and the stochastic transition q over
private types, and (b) individuals form beliefs over future types and actions in
the population consistently with the law of motion governing the distribution of
private types (i.e., capital levels), given the joint strategy of all players.
Studying equilibria in games with infinitesimal players has one important ad-
vantage. Since individual players have negligible impact on the distribution of
types and actions in the population, each one of them faces a standard Markov
decision problem (henceforth, MDP), conditional on the distributions of future
types {τn} and types-actions {µn}. Only private types are drawn (independently)
each period and fluctuate according to probability distribution q.
Importantly, the problem of each player admits a recursive formulation. To
see that, suppose the players share a macro belief Φ, i.e., a transition function for
capital-investment distributions between periods, where µn+1 = Φ(µn). Together
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with an initial distribution µ1, this allows players to conjecture a candidate equi-
librium path of the game and formulate their sequential problem recursively, with
the value function v∗ satisfying
v∗(t, µ; Φ) = max
a∈[0,t]
{










An MSNDE consists of a measure µ∗ over type-actions in the population in
the initial period and a macro belief transition Φ∗ such that, when treating those
as given, almost every player solves their MDP and the resulting distribution over
types and actions coincides with µ∗. In particular, the marginal distribution of µ∗
over types (wealth/capital) must be equal to the exogenously given initial distri-
bution τ1. Moreover, the perceived macro belief Φ
∗, under rational expectations,
is consistent with the actual transition q and the initial distribution. In particu-
lar, under the exact law of large numbers, one can associate probabilities q with
distributions over types in T .
In addition, any equilibrium pair (µ∗,Φ∗) generates a sequence of equilibrium
measures {µ∗n}, where µ∗1 = µ∗ and µ∗n+1 = Φ∗(µ∗n). MSNDE is stationary in the
sense that the corresponding strategies of players and their beliefs are independent
of time. However, our concept is inherently dynamic and allows us to evaluate
and compare the entire equilibrium paths of types and actions.
Our motivating example is a game with dynamic strategic complementarities.
In this game, it is optimal for every individual to increase their own wealth and
consumption as the distribution of wealth and consumption in the population
increases stochastically. More importantly, such complementarities are present
within and across periods. In particular, anticipating (stochastically) higher dis-
tributions of capital tomorrow provides incentives for players to increase their own
investment today at the expense of the current consumption. Whether a game
exhibits such complementarities depends critically on two reinforcing conditions:
(i) increasing differences between the private type (capital) and anticipated pop-
ulation distribution in the following period, and (ii) agents forming monotone
beliefs, i.e., expecting higher population distribution tomorrow when faced with a
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higher distribution today.9 This example has both features. This is in contrast to
the complementarities that arise in stochastic steady-state or stationary equilibria,
which are essentially static by definition.
Finally, we can characterize the comparative statics/dynamics of equilibrium
paths. We show, how changes in parameters of the game (e.g., discount factor,
preference or technology parameters, the initial distribution τ1 of types) affect
paths of equilibrium distributions {µ∗n} (implied by equilibrium µ∗ and Φ∗), as
well as the steady states to which they converge. Since the measure µ∗n is defined
over the space of types and actions, it is crucial to provide novel equilibrium com-
parative statics result for spaces of multidimensional distributions, that extend
the existing comparative statics results in a non-trivial fashion.
2 Large stochastic games with complementari-
ties
In this section we formally define the model and our notion of equilibrium. A
glossary of basic mathematical definitions is provided in the appendix.
Consider a stochastic game in discrete time with an infinite horizon. Let
(Λ,L, λ) be a probability space of players. It is critical to our analysis that this
space is super-atomless. This formalization is necessary to show that the agents
can form their beliefs about types of other players by exploiting the exact law of
large numbers.10 To fix ideas, one intuitive example of such a space is the product
measure space over [0, 1]I , where each factor is endowed with Lebesgue measure
and I is uncountable.
In each period n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} a player is endowed with a private type t ∈ T ⊆ Rp,
where T is compact and T denotes its Borel σ-algebra. Let A ⊆ Rk be a compact
space of all conceivable actions endowed with the Borel σ-algebra A. We endow T
9 Hence, our work is related to recent work on characterizing single crossing in distributions
(e.g., Quah and Strulovici, 2012 and Kartik et al., 2019).
10 See the appendix for a formal definition and a comprehensive discussion on this notion.
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and A with the natural product partial order ≥.11 Finally, let M be a set of prob-
ability measures on T ⊗A, and MT be the set of probability measures on T , where
both spaces are ranked with the corresponding first order stochastic dominance
order and endowed with the topology of weak convergence of measures.12
Given a distribution τ of types of all (other) players, a player of type t chooses
an action a ∈ Ã(t, τ) ⊆ A, where Ã : T × MT ⇒ A is the feasible action
correspondence. The player’s within-period payoff is determined by a bounded
function r : T × A×M → R that takes values r(t, a, µ), given a private type t,
an action a, and a probability measure µ over types and actions of all players.
In this paper, we investigate dynamic games in which private types of play-
ers are determined stochastically in each period. The transition probability is
represented by a function q : T × A×M → MT that assigns a probability mea-
sure q(·|t, a, µ) over private types in the following period to their current type t,
action a, and the measure µ of types-actions in the population.
2.1 Players’ decision problem
In order to define the sequential decision problem for each player, we need to spec-
ify how the individual is forming beliefs about future types of other players in the
game, based on the current distribution of types and strategies in the population.
We begin with some basic assumptions on the primitives of the game.13
Assumption 1. For all τ ∈ MT and µ ∈ M:
(i) Correspondence t ⇒ Ã(t, τ) is measurable and compact-valued.
(ii) Function (a, t) → q(·|t, a, µ) is Borel-measurable.
Given that the measure space of players is super-atomless, Assumption 1 guar-
antees that the (endogenous) transition of private types satisfies a no aggregate
11 For any x, y ∈ Rℓ, we say that x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi, for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
12 See Remark A.1 in the appendix for a discussion regarding the relationship between order
topology and weak convergence of measures.
13 A glossary containing basic mathematical terminology, including the details regarding the
dynamic ELLN in the immediate sequel, is provided in the appendix.
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uncertainty condition in each period (hence, it evolves deterministically).14 For-
mally, given the current distribution µ of types and actions in the population, the




q(S|t, a, µ)µ(dt× da). (1)
Therefore, it is determined by the current distribution µ and the transition q. This
no aggregate uncertainty condition for a super-atomless probability space of play-
ers follows from results in Sun (2006) and Podczeck (2010). Such an appropriate
exact law of large numbers (ELLN) simplifies our analysis of large random popu-
lations by (i) allowing for independent draws of types for a continuum of players;
(ii) simplifying the dynamics of the aggregate law of motion of distributions over
types-actions in the population; and (iii) allowing each agent to form beliefs us-
ing the law of large numbers, rather than updating their beliefs on (the product
of) types of other players. By ELLN and universality of rich Fubini extension
as in Sun (2006), we show the no-aggregate-uncertainty assumption holds in our
setting. See Section A.1.2 in the appendix for details.
Given the formulation of beliefs, we define the decision problem of a player
in a candidate Markov stationary Nash distributional equilibrium. Let H∞ be




n∈N, where an ∈ Ã(tn, τn). Let Hn be the set




j=1 : aj ∈ Ã(tj, τj)
}
. A
strategy is a sequence of functions (σn)n∈N such that σn : Hn−1 × T ×MT → A
is Borel-measurable in (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ T n and σn(hn−1, tn, τn) ∈ Ã(tn, τn), where
H0 = ∅ and initial values of t1, τ1 are given. A strategy (σn)n∈N is Markov if in
each period n, we have, σn : T ×MT → A, i.e., the action depends only on the
current type t ∈ T and the current distribution of types τ ∈ MT . Hence, it is
history-independent. A Markov strategy is stationary if it is time-invariant, i.e.,
we have σn = σn′ , for any time periods n, n
′.
Given an initial private type t, a public distribution of types τ , and a Markov
strategy σ′ of other players, a Markov strategy σ induces the unique private mea-




t,τ on histories of the game. The sequential objective of a player is
R
(



















where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, Eσ,σ
′











,15 where idT denotes the identity function over T .
We impose the following assumptions.16
Assumption 2 (Payoffs). The function r is (i) continuous in (t, a), (ii) monotone
sup- and inf-preserving in µ, (iii) increasing in t, (iv) supermodular in a; and





Assumption 3 (Transition probability). The transition kernel q(·|t, a, µ) is (i) con-
tinuous in (t, a), (ii) monotone sup- and inf-preserving in µ, (iii) stochastically
increasing in (t, a, µ), (iv) stochastically supermodular in a, and (v) has stochas-





Assumption 4 (Feasible actions). The correspondence Ã : T × MT ⇒ A is
(i) continuous; (ii) its values are compact sublattices of A; (iii) increasing with t
in the sense of set inclusion; (iv) increasing with t in the strong set order; and
(v) satisfies strict complementarities.
Most of these assumptions are standard in dynamic games with complemen-
tarities (see Curtat, 1996 and Balbus et al., 2014) with the exception of some
monotonicity requirements on payoffs and the transition function. As shown later
in the paper, these are indispensable to preserve strategic complementarities across
periods in the extensive formulation of the game under Markovian strategies. Im-
portantly, our framework encompasses many of the important linear social inter-
action models studied in the econometric literature by Blume et al. (2015); Kline
and Tamer (2020) and Kwok (2019).17
15 We employ the standard notation, where for any measure ν, function f , and a measurable
set S, we have νf−1(S) = ν
(
{s ∈ S : f(s) ∈ S}
)
.
16 We present the mathematical terminology in the appendix.
17 For example, the payoff function studied in Kwok (2019) satisfies our assumptions (see
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An example of a transition function q satisfying Assumption 3 is
q(·|t, a, µ) := g(t, a, µ)ρ(·) +
(
1 − g(t, a, µ)
)
ν(·),





(t, µ); and is increasing in (a, t, µ); while ρ, ν are probability distributions over T
such that ρ first order stochastically dominates ν. This class of transitions was
introduced in Curtat (1996) and Amir (2002), and has been successfully applied
in the related literature.18
Remark 1. Assumption 3 implies that, in general, the transition cannot be de-
terministic. Indeed, supermodularity and increasing differences of the integrand∫
f(t′)q(dt′|t, a, µ) must hold for any integrable and monotone function f , which
is generally not satisfied for deterministic transitions.19 However, if A ⊆ R (an
important special case in the applied literature) then, for any continuous and in-
creasing function g : A → T , the deterministic transition given by q(S|t, a, µ) = 1,
if g(a) ∈ S, and q(S|t, a, µ) = 0 otherwise, satisfies our assumption.
Remark 2. Whenever the action space A is one-dimensional and the transition
function q depends only on action a, our results remain true even if the payoff
function r is not increasing in t and the correspondence Ã is not increasing in t
in the set inclusion order. This follows directly from our constructive argument
in Section 2.3 and will become clear in the remainder of the paper.
An important feature of our framework is that the sequential problem in (2)
admits a recursive representation. Let Φ : M → M determine the next pe-
equiation (1) in their paper). Our constructive monotone comparative statics/dynamics results
presented in the following section may be useful in developing and characterizing estimators to
test equilibrium distributions in empirical models. See, e.g., Echenique and Komunjer (2009,
2013), DePaula (2013), and Uetake and Watanabe (2013).
18 For example, see Balbus et al. (2013) for a discussion on the nature of these assumptions.
19 Indeed, (deterministic) transition q(S|t, a, µ) = 1 if g(t, a, µ) ∈ S, and q(S|t, a, µ) = 0 oth-
erwise does not satisfy our assumption, even when g is increasing in all variables, supermodular




and (t, µ). It is so, even when such a determin-











π(dz′) does not have increasing differences between
(a, t), unless f is convex.
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riod distribution Φ(µ) over types and actions in the population, given the cur-
rent distribution µ. By (1), the marginal of Φ(µ) over types in T is ϕ(µ)(S) =∫
T×A q(S|t, a, µ)µ(dt × da), for any measurable set S. Denote µT := margT (µ),
where margT (µ) returns a marginal of µ on T . In the remainder of this sec-
tion, we show that for any initial distribution µ and any function Φ, the value
corresponding to the problem (2) satisfies
v∗(t, µ; Φ) = max
a∈Ã(t,µT )
{











Given the initial distribution µ and the perceived law of motion Φ, the player’s
problem is a MDP with uncertainty about the future private signal t only. Thus,
under the exact law of large numbers, the sequence of aggregate distributions
{µn}n∈N is deterministic. Using standard arguments, we show that the best re-
sponse correspondence of each player is Markovian on the natural state space of
current types t and measures µ. However, our definition of equilibrium requires
consistency between such a policy and the perceived law of motion Φ. Since Φ
specifies beliefs of players on continuation paths of the game, we write v∗(t, µ; Φ)
to stress that the value function and the corresponding policy depend on the
beliefs.21
2.2 Markov stationary Nash distributional equilibria
We now define the notion of equilibrium we use in this paper.
Definition 1 (Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium). A pair (µ∗,Φ∗)
with µ∗ ∈ M and Φ∗ : M → M is a Markov Stationary Nash Distribution Equi-
librium (MSNDE) whenever:
(i) there is a function v∗ such that, for any µ ∈ M and almost every t ∈ T ,
v∗(t, µ; Φ∗) = max
a∈Ã(t,µT )
{










20 Equivalently, one may use t, τ as state variables and construct µ by composing τ and a
strategy σ : T → A. In such a case, the strategy σ would have to be included as an additional
parameter of the value function.
21 Compare with equilibrium in Kalai and Shmaya (2018) for large but finite repeated games.
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(ii) there is a measurable selection σµ,Φ∗ of the correspondence Σµ,Φ∗ : T ⇒ A:
Σµ,Φ∗(t) := arg max
a∈Ã(t,µT )
{


















, for any µ ∈ M.
An MSNDE consists of an initial distribution µ∗ on types and actions, a
Markov transition function Φ∗, and it involves an equilibrium policy σµ,Φ∗ : T → A.
MSNDE is stationary in the sense that equilibrium strategies and beliefs of all




implies a dynamic interaction of each player with the future distributions of types
and actions in the population, through the equilibrium law of motion Φ∗.
Condition (i) is a standard Bellman equation characterizing players’ best re-
ply correspondences. The second part of the definition imposes a two-fold con-
sistency. First of all, µ∗ = µ∗T (idT , σµ∗,Φ∗)
−1 guarantees that the distribution of
actions is generated by the equilibrium strategy σµ∗,Φ∗ , given the initial distri-
bution of types and the equilibrium law of motion. In addition, we require that
Φ∗(µ) = ϕ(µ)(idT , σΦ∗(µ),Φ∗)
−1. Thus the perceived macro belief and the actual
law of motion for aggregate distributions (i.e., generated by the best-response se-
lection σΦ∗(µ),Φ∗) must coincide.
22 The Markov transition Φ∗ specifies common
beliefs each player uses to determine future paths of equilibrium distributions.
In macroeconomic literature on recursive equilibria, such beliefs are often called
rational. Since Φ∗(µ) = ϕ(µ)(idT , σΦ∗(µ),Φ∗)
−1, for any µ ∈ M, the function Φ∗
specifies beliefs ’on’ and ’off’ equilibrium paths.
To state our main result, we introduce one final piece of notation. Let
D :=
{
Φ : M → M : Φ is increasing and monotone
inf-preserving and margT (Φ(µ)) = ϕ(µ), for any µ ∈ M
}
. (4)
Therefore, we restrict our attention to functions/beliefs Φ that are increasing and
monotone inf-preserving. We endow D with the pointwise order, i.e., function Φ′
22 Since we work with no aggregate uncertainty, we do not require that Φ∗ is measurable.
14
dominates Φ if the probability measure Φ′(µ) first order stochastically dominates
Φ′(µ), for all µ ∈ M. We endow D with the topology of pointwise convergence.
Remark 3. Dually, let D′ :=
{





= ϕ(µ), for any µ ∈ M
}
. To save space, we
focus on D, but all constructions and results have their counterpart in D′.
Consider the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. Let Assumptions 1–4 be satisfied. Then, any large stochastic game
with complementarities has a Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium
(MSNDE). In particular, there exists a greatest MSNDE of the game in M×D
and a least MSNDE of the game in M×D′.
We postpone the proof until Section 2.3. The above theorem requires some
comment. First, apart from providing sufficient conditions for existence of an
MSNDE, Theorem 1 guarantees existence of a monotone MSNDE, consisting of
monotone beliefs Φ∗ and monotone strategies σµ,Φ∗ . Moreover, the space of all
MSNDE in M × D admits a greatest element. Similarly, there exists a least
MSNDE in the space M×D′. Finally, if the set of maximizers to the optimization
problem on the right hand-side in (3) is unique, then the set of MSNDE is chain
complete, i.e., closed under monotone sequences of equilibria in M×{D ∩D′}.
Remark 4. Any MSNDE induces a sequential distributional equilibrium as in
Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988), i.e., {µ∗n}n∈N, where µ∗1 = µ∗ and µ∗n = Φ∗(µ∗n−1).
In fact, such sequential distributional equilibrium can be constructed for any initial
distribution of types of all players τ . Indeed, it is clear from Definition 1 that µ∗
can be constructed using any distribution on types τ = margT (µ) and a stationary
equilibrium policy σ∗.23
A natural question is whether there is an invariant distribution induced by
MSNDE that would give rise to a stochastic stationary equilibrium — a fixed
point of a global distributional equilibrium dynamics generated by an MSNDE.
23 See also our construction in equations (6) and (7).
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Proposition 1 (Invariant distributions). Under assumptions 1–4, there exists a
stochastic stationary equilibrium. In particular, there exists a greatest invariant
distribution ν̄ induced by the greatest MSNDE (µ̄∗,Φ
∗
), i.e., ν̄ = Φ
∗
(ν̄) and a least
invariant distribution ν induced by the least MSNDE (µ∗,Φ∗).
We omit the proof. The existence of invariant distributions is guaranteed by
monotonicity of Φ and Φ, and the fact that the space of measures M is a chain
complete poset.24 By Proposition A.1 in the appendix, both operators admit a
greatest and a least fixed point (invariant distribution), and these extremal fixed
points can be obtained through successive iterations on the mappings Φ
∗
and





also an MSNDE. In fact, the pair (ν,Φ∗) is a MSNDE as well, for any invariant
distribution ν generated by Φ∗.25
We prove Theorem 1 in the following subsection. It is important to point
out that our argument is constructive and based upon order continuous succes-
sive approximation techniques. In particular, we introduce an explicit iterative
algorithm that approximates the greatest equilibrium of the game. To present
our construction, we require additional notation. For any µ ∈ M, Φ ∈ D, and
function v, let
Γ(t, µ,Φ; v) := arg max
a∈Ã(t,µT )
{











i.e., the set of maximizers of the player’s MDP. Define the greatest element of the
set by γ(t, µ,Φ; v), if it exists. Let ⋆ be a binary operation between τ ∈ MT and
the set of measurable functions h : T → A returning probability measure on T×A
τ ⋆ h := τ(idT , h)
−1. (6)
Define the operator Ψ mapping M×D into itself, where Ψ(µ,Φ) = (µ′,Φ′) and





for all µ ∈ M, where v∗ : T ×M×D → R is a function solving (3).
24 See, e.g., Lemma 2 in Balbus et al. (2019).
25 However, it must be that ν̄ is dominated by µ̄∗.
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Proposition 2 (Bounds approximation). Let µ̄ and Φ be the greatest elements







) is the greatest MSNDE.
An analogous approximation result holds for the least MSNDE. Our results
contribute to several strands of economics literature. First, we extend the results
on existence of equilibria in large anonymous sequential games that date back
to Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988), Bergin and Bernhardt (1992), and Karatzas
et al. (1994). In particular, we prove existence of minimal state space station-
ary Markovian distributional Nash equilibrium within the subclass of games that
(in addition) possess strategic complementarities. Second, we extend the class
of games with strategic complementarities (GSC) to a dynamic setting with a
measure space of players. Following Van Zandt (2010) and van Zandt and Vives
(2007), a few recent papers generalized the class of supermodular games and GSC
to normal-form games with complete and incomplete information. See, e.g., Bal-
bus et al. (2015b), Balbus et al. (2015a, 2019), and Bilancini and Boncinelli (2016),
who construct the necessary tools for a study of large static games with strate-
gic complementarities. We extend these results to Markovian equilibria in large
dynamic games.
The tools used in our paper extend significantly the ones in Balbus et al.
(2013, 2014), where the question under study is the existence and characteriza-
tion of Markovian equilibria in dynamic games with a finite number of players.
Specifically, within the context of a large game framework, the current paper re-
laxes some strong geometrical assumptions on the (aggregate) transition function
q required in stochastic supermodular games with a finite number of players.26
Indeed, the context of a large game allows us to avoid multiple issues related to
extensive-form supermodular games as discussed, e.g., in Amir (2002), Echenique
(2004), Vives (2009), and Mensch (2020). Our assumptions guarantee that the
stationary value functions in each player’s decision problem has increasing dif-
ferences in the private type and the distribution over types and actions in the
26 See Assumption 1 in Balbus et al. (2013) and Assumption 2 in Balbus et al. (2014) which
are necessary to guarantee that equilibrium dynamics do not lead to an absorbing state.
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population. With this structure in place, our large stochastic supermodular game
remains extensive-form supermodular over the infinite horizon. This is critical for
equilibrium comparative statics/dynamics. Given the distributional specification
of the game, we are able to avoid issues with characterizing dynamic complemen-
tarities in actions across periods and beliefs, reported recently in Mensch (2020)
for dynamic Bayesian games with a finite number of players. Finally, as in Balbus
et al. (2014), the existence of the extremal MSNDEs is proven constructively, by
applying successive approximations starting from the greatest (respectively, the
lowest) strategies. In this sense, we provide the applied researchers with tools that
allow to approximate sequences of equilibrium distributions.
2.3 Construction of equilibria
We devote this subsection to the proof of Theorem 1. We present our argument
via a number of lemmas that may be of individual interest. We prove existence
of the greatest MSNDE only. The argument for the least MSNDE is analogous.
Let Assumptions 1–4 be satisfied. We begin by showing that the problem in
(2) admits a recursive representation. In particular, for any Markov transition
function Φ ∈ D, there is a unique function v satisfying (3). Let V be the space
of functions v : T × M × D 7→ R such that: (i) v is uniformly bounded by a
value r̄ > 0, (ii) v(·, µ,Φ) is increasing and continuous, for any (µ,Φ) ∈ M×D,





. We endow V with the sup-norm topology || · ||∞.27
Lemma 1. V is a complete metric space.
Given that V is a subset of all bounded functions, it is a subset of a Banach
space. Hence, it suffices to show that the set is closed. Since continuity, mono-
tonicity, and increasing differences are preserved in the sup-norm convergence,
the main difficulty is to show that any limit of monotone inf-preserving functions
preserves this property. We prove this in the appendix.
27 That is, we have ||v||∞ := sup(t,µ,Φ)∈T×M×D |v(t, µ; Φ)|.
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The next lemma provides an important feature of Markov transition func-
tions Φ. It follows immediately from Lemma A.2 in the appendix.
Lemma 2. Let {µk}k∈N be a decreasing sequence in M that weakly converges to µ
in M. Let {Φk}k∈N be a decreasing sequence in D that pointwise weakly converges




k∈N weakly converges to Φ(µ).
Define an operator B : V → V as
(Bv)(t, µ,Φ) := max
a∈Ã(t,µT )
{











Some basic properties of the operator B are provided below.
Lemma 3. For any v ∈ V, function (Bv) is continuous and increasing in t, jointly





Denote the function within the brackets in (8) by







q(dt′|t, a, µ). (9)
Given Assumptions 2–4, F (t, a, µ; v,Φ) is increasing in t, jointly continuous in








. We claim it is




k∈N is a de-
creasing sequence that converges to (µ,Φ). By Lemma 2, we have Φn(µn) →
Φ(µ). By Assumption 2 and the choice of the set V , it must be that both





















q(dt′|t, a, µk), which follows
from Lemma A.3 in the appendix. Hence, F is inf-preserving. Showing that it is
sup-preserving can be done analogously. We are ready to prove Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 3. Continuity of (Bv) follows from Berge’s Maximum Theorem
(see Theorem 17.31 in Aliprantis and Border, 2006). Monotonicity of (Bv) in t
is implied by monotonicity of F and the fact that Ã increases in t with respect





k∈N that converges to some (µ,Φ). We know
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that F (t, ak, µk; v,Φk) → F (t, a, µ; v,Φ) whenever ak → a. By Lemma A.4 in
the appendix, this suffices for (Bv)(t, µk,Φk) → (Bv)(t, µ,Φ). Finally, we show




, for any v ∈ V . Equivalently,





, for any v. By Assumptions 2 and 3 the function F (t, a, µ; v,Φ) is









The rest follows from Lemma A.1 in the appendix that generalizes Lemma 1 in
Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992).
Proposition 3. Operator B : V → V has a unique fixed point in V.
Indeed, Lemma 3 guarantees that B is a well-defined operator that maps a
complete metric space V into itself (recall Lemma 1 and 3). Therefore, it suffices
to show that B is a contraction mapping on V . This fact follows from Blackwell’s
sufficient conditions for contraction and can be shown using an argument analo-
gous to the one supporting Theorem 3.3 in Stokey et al. (1989).28 Since the metric
space V (with the sup-norm) is complete, B has a unique fixed point. Finally,
showing that the value coincides with the value of the original problem (2) can be
done using standard arguments.29
Given that the value function has increasing differences in both arguments
(t, µ) and the transition Φ∗ is monotone, we can guarantee that the current ac-
tions of players and their beliefs regarding the future distribution of types and
actions in the population are complements. As a result, we are able to show ex-
istence of equilibrium by applying constructive order-theoretic tools (rather than
purely topological constructions) which allow us to unify our existence results with
equilibrium comparative dynamics results.
We proceed with the second half of the argument where we prove existence of
the greatest MSNDE. Recall the definition of the correspondence Γ from (5), with
its greatest selection γ : T ×M×D → A. Consider the following lemma.
28 Indeed, if v′ pointwise dominates v, then Bv′ pointwise dominates Bv. Moreover, for any




(t, µ; Φ) ≤ (Bv)((t, µ; Φ) + βa.
29 See, for example, Theorem 9.2 in Stokey et al. (1989).
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Lemma 4. For any v ∈ V, the greatest selection γ is a well-defined function,
measurable in t, increasing in (t, µ,Φ), and monotone inf-preserving.
Proof. For any v ∈ V , we have Γ(t, µ; v,Φ) = arg maxa∈Ã(t,µT ) F (t, a, µ; v,Φ). It is
straightforward to verify that F is supermodular and continuous in a. Since the
set Ã(t, µT ) is a complete sublattice of A, by Corollary 4.1 in Topkis (1978), the set
Γ(t, µ; v,Φ) is a complete sublattice of A. Therefore, it admits both the greatest
and the least element. We show that γ is measurable in the appendix. Monotonic-
ity follows from increasing differences of F and Theorem 6.2 in Topkis (1978).30 To




k∈N be a decreasing sequence





decreasing. Suppose it converges to some γ and, thus, γ(t, µk,Φk; v) ≥ γ, for all
k ∈ N. Since F is continuous and monotone inf-preserving, Lemma A.4 in the
appendix guarantees that γ ∈ Γ(t, µ; v,Φ). Thus, it must be that γ ≤ γ(t, µ,Φ; v),
and so γ ≤ γ(t, µ,Φ; v) ≤ γ(t, µk,Φk; v).
For the following lemma, recall the definition of the binary operation ⋆ in (6).
Lemma 5. For any measures τ, τ ′ ∈ MT such that τ ′ first order stochastically
dominates τ , and any increasing functions h, h′ : T × A → A such that h′ domi-
nates h pointwise, the measure (τ ′ ⋆h′) first order stochastically dominates (τ ⋆h).
The proof of the above lemma is straightforward, hence, we omit it.
Lemma 6. Let {τk}k∈N be a decreasing sequence in MT converging to some τ ,
and let {hk}k∈N be a (pointwise) decreasing sequence converging to some h, where
hk : T × A → A are increasing and monotone inf-preserving functions. Then
(τk ⋆ hk) → (τ ⋆ h) in the sense of weak convergence.
Proof. This follows from Lemma A.2 in the appendix.31 We only need to show
that τ ⋆ h is inf-preserving in h. Take an arbitrary τ ∈ MT and let hk be a
decreasing sequence of Borel functions mapping T to A. Let h = limk→∞ hk.
30 See the glossary in the appendix.
31 Here the role of Ξ plays MT , and the role of fk plays h 7→ (τk ⋆ h).
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f(t, a)(τ ⋆ h)(dt× da).
Hence, (τ ⋆ hk) → (τ ⋆ h) weakly. This completes the proof.
Take the unique function v∗ that solves the equation (3). Define operator Ψ
as in (7). Given monotonicity of γ(t, µ,Φ; v) and Lemma 5, we conclude that it is
increasing. Moreover, by Lemmas 4 and 6, it is also monotonically inf-preserving.
Before completing the proof of Theorem 1, we require one more ancillary result.
Lemma 7. The set D is a lower chain complete poset.
Proof. Let {Φj}j∈J be a chain in D and Φ :=
∧
j∈J Φj. It suffices to show that Φ
is monotone inf-preserving. Let {µk}k∈N be a decreasing sequence in M that con-









As k → ∞, we obtain∫
T×A













We conclude by taking the infimum with respect to j on the right hand-side.
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. It suffices to show that there is the greatest fixed point of
Ψ defined in (7). Note that Ψ is monotone in (µ,Φ). Indeed, by Lemma 4,
γ(t, µ,Φ; v∗) is jointly increasing in (t, µ,Φ). By Lemma 6, this implies mono-
tonicity of µ′ in (7). By the same argument Φ′ in (7) is increasing in µ and Φ.
Moreover, by Lemmas 4 and 6, we conclude that Ψ is a monotone inf-preserving
self-map on M×D. By applying Proposition A.1 in the appendix, we conclude
that there exists a greatest MSNDE.32
32Whenever the best response γ is single valued it can be shown using Markowsky (1976)
theorem 9 that the fixed point set of Ψ = Ψ is a chain complete poset.
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3 Monotone equilibrium comparative dynamics
Here, we discuss the nature of constructive monotone equilibrium comparative
dynamics (see, e.g., Huggett, 2003) in the class of games studied in Section 2. To
do this, we parameterize primitives of our game with a parameter θ, that belongs
to a poset (Θ,≥Θ), and seek conditions under which MSNDEs are ordered with
respect to θ. Given our definition of equilibrium, this means that the selection
θ → µ∗θ and the equilibrium law of motion θ → Φ∗θ are increasing in the following
sense: if θ′ ≥Θ θ then µ∗θ′ stochastically dominates µ∗θ, and the measure Φ∗θ′(µ)
stochastically dominates Φ∗θ(µ), for all measures µ ∈ M. Since our notion of equi-
librium is inherently dynamic, we use the term monotone comparative dynamics
rather than comparative statics. We define a positive shock.33
Assumption 5 (Positive shock). Let Θ be a poset. (i) The payoff function r(t, a, µ; θ)
has increasing differences in (a, θ) and (t, θ); (ii) the transition kernel q(·|t, a, µ; θ)
is increasing in θ and has increasing differences in (a, θ) and (t, θ); (iii) the feasible
action correspondence Ã(t, µ; θ) has strict complementarities in (t, θ).
Theorem 2 (Monotone Comparative Distributional Dynamics). Suppose that the
parameterized mappings r(·, θ), q(·; θ), and Ã(·; θ) satisfy Assumptions 1–4, for all













is increasing in θ.
Proof. We prove the case for the greatest equilibrium only. The proof for the
lowest equilibrium is analogous. Let Ψθ be the counterpart of the operator Ψ in
the parameterized game with θ ∈ Θ. Similarly, we define ϕθ, Φθ, and γθ, mutatis
mutandis. Given that q(·|t, a, µ; θ) is increasing in θ, it suffices to show that










has increasing differences in (t, θ), for any µ ∈ M
33 Our notion of a positive shock is consistent with the terminology of Acemoglu and Jensen
(2015). However, we consider comparative equilibrium transitional dynamics. In this sense,
our question is closely related to issues studied in Huggett (1997). Recall, in Huggett (1997),
monotone aggregate dynamics are only available from initial distributions below the stochastic
steady state. Here, our MSNDE dynamics are globally monotone.
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(recall Lemma A.1 in the appendix and the argument in the second part of the
proof to Lemma 3). By Theorem 6.2 in Topkis (1978) (see the glossary in the
appendix), we conclude that γθ is increasing in θ. By Assumption 5, we know
that θ → ϕθ is increasing. By Lemma 5, the same property is inherited by Ψθ,
i.e., for θ′ ≥ θ, Ψθ′(µ,Φ) = (µθ′ ,Φθ′) pointwise dominates Ψθ′(µ,Φ) = (µθ,Φθ).
Equivalently, µθ′ first order stochastically dominates µθ and the measure Φθ′(µ)
first order stochastically dominates Φθ(µ), for all µ ∈ M. As in the proof of
Theorem 1, Ψθ is an increasing operator, for any fixed θ. To complete the proof
we apply Proposition A.2, recalling that the poset of distributions and the poset
of uniformly bounded functions are chain complete.
An immediate corollary follows: Under Assumptions 1–4, the greatest equilib-
rium increases in the initial distribution of types τ1.
34 Indeed, if we let θ = τ1 and
Θ = MT is ordered in the stochastic sense, then Assumption 5 holds.
Our monotone comparative dynamics results both improve upon and comple-
ment the results in the existing literature, including those found in Adlakha and
Johari (2013), Acemoglu and Jensen (2010, 2015), Light and Weintraub (2019).
These papers discuss comparative statics of stochastic steady state equilibria or
mean-field equilibria, rather than MSNDE. In particular, they focus on (a) the
set of equilibrium invariant and/or steady state distributions, and (b) games with
an aggregative structure. In contrast, we provide conditions under which (ex-
tremal) MSNDE equilibrium transition paths exist and are increasing globally in
the deep parameters. In our case, as the equilibrium distribution µ∗θ and the law







period, and so on.35 Therefore, the entire equilibrium path shifts with respect to
the parameter θ. Further, as these equilibrium paths converge to a steady state,
the greatest invariant distribution ν̄θ induced by the greatest equilibrium is also
increasing in θ.36
34 Analogous comparative dynamics apply to the least MSNDE.
35 This complements the approach to transitional dynamics in Huggett (1997).
36 A similar argument applies the least equilibrium global distributional dynamic path and
the least invariant distribution (or the least steady-state).
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It bears mentioning that the assumptions in Acemoglu and Jensen (2015,
2018), and Light and Weintraub (2019) are not sufficient for an analogous mono-
tone comparative dynamics result. The key difference between these works and
ours is that, when studying comparative statics of a steady-state equilibrium (or
mean-field equilibrium), one does not investigate dynamic complementarities be-
tween current actions and future distributions of types and actions in the pop-
ulation. This is because stochastic steady-state equilibria are inherently static,
unlike our dynamic notion of MSNDE. For this reason, we require extra assump-
tions to guarantee that the equilibrium dynamics of the economy under study
are sufficiently monotone. These assumptions are not vacuous, as the literature
includes many examples of dynamic economies that do not satisfy our conditions.
Indeed, the standard Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models of wealth distribution with
infinitely lived agents and the presence of incomplete markets are, in general, not
monotone in the sense specified here. We address this in Section 4.6.
Our results apply to distributions over multidimensional space Rn. In fact, the
multidimensionality is inherent if one studies distributions over types and actions
(as in our motivating example). Since spaces of measures over multidimensional
spaces are not lattices, we employ the alternative tool from Proposition A.2 in
the appendix, as the well-known Tarski’s fixed point theorem does not apply.37
Finally, our monotone comparative statics/dynamics results are constructive.
We characterize the chain of parameterized equilibria converging to the one of
interest, for a particular parameter θ. This is of utmost importance for applied
economists who calibrate moments of equilibrium invariant distributions, or econo-
metrically estimate equilibrium comparative statics/dynamics in the data (e.g.,
with quantile methods in Echenique and Komunjer, 2009, 2013).38
37 See also the discussion in Section 3 of Light and Weintraub (2019).
38 See Cao et al. (2020) for a discussion regarding numerical methods related to the global
dynamic equilibrium models such as ours.
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4 Applications and examples
Here, we discuss some economic applications of our results.
4.1 Motivating example revisited
Recall the motivating example from the Introduction. In each period, the type of
a player is determined by their level of capital/wealth t ∈ T = [0, 1]. Their actions
(investments) a ∈ A = [0, 1] are chosen from the feasible set Ã(t, τ) = [0, t]. Given
the distribution µ of types-actions of all players, the payoff in a single period is




θm(t− t̃) + w(t− a− t̃ + ã)
]
µ(dã× dt̃).
Here we introduce a positive parameter θ with respect to the initial example.
Given an investment a, the cumulative probability distribution of the capital
level t′ in the following period is q(t′|a). Thus, conditional on the macro belief Φ,
the Bellman equation determining the player’s value function is
v(t, µ; Φ) = max
a∈Ã(t,µT )
{









This game satisfies Assumptions 1–4. Indeed, correspondence Ã is measurable,
continuous, compact-valued, increasing in t, and satisfies strong complementari-
ties. Given that the functions m and w are continuous, increasing, and concave,





and (t, µ). The function is also (trivially) supermodular
in a, and continuous in µ. As long as the distribution q is continuous in a, the
requirements of Theorem 1 for existence of the greatest MSNDE are satisfied.
As it was pointed out in Section 2, the equilibrium pair (µ∗,Φ∗) generates the
entire equilibrium path of distributions {µ∗n}, where µ∗1 = µ∗ and µn+1 = Φ∗(µn),
which allows us to track the dynamics of the model. Moreover, the sequence
converges to an invariant distribution, allowing for the study of steady states.
Apart from existence and approximation of equilibria, Theorem 2 allows us to
say more about its equilibrium comparative dynamics. In particular, the equilib-
rium (µ∗,Φ∗) and the corresponding sequence {µ∗n} increase as the initial distri-
bution of types τ1 increases in the first order stochastic sense. That is, along an
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equilibrium path that converges to a steady state, players invest more and have
higher capital levels (stochastically). In addition, the equilibrium changes mono-
tonically with respect to the parameter θ. One can easily verify that the return
function r has increasing differences in (a, θ) and (t, θ). As the correspondence Ã
and transition kernel q are independent of θ, this suffices for the equilibrium path
to be increasing in θ. Thus, the higher the weight of the wealth-driven status, the
higher (stochastically) are the investments in the population.
These results hold for more a general transition q(·|t, a, µ), that depends on the
investment of each player, their type, and the distribution of wealth-investments
in the population. However, this would require for Assumption 3 to hold.
4.2 Dynamics of social distance
Next, we analyze a dynamic model of social distance based on Akerlof (1997).39
Consider a measure space of agents. Let T = [0, 1] be the set of all possible social
positions in the population. Each period an individual is characterized by an
identity t ∈ T (private type), which determines the social position to which the
agent aspires. Each period the agent chooses their own social position (action)





, where functions a, a : T → A are increasing functions and
satisfy a(t) ≤ t ≤ a(t), for all t ∈ T . Thus, limiting social mobility.
When choosing social position, there is a trade-off between idealism and con-
formism. On one hand, the individual wants the social status a to be as close to
their identity t as possible. Specifically, given some continuous, decreasing, and





captures idealism. On the other hand, the player experiences discomfort when
interacting with agents that have different social position from theirs. Whenever
an agent of a social position a encounters an agent of a social position a′, they each
39 The model is related to multiple strands of the social economics literature, including models
of identity and economic choice as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), or models with endogenous
social reference points, including Bernheim (1994), Brock and Durlauf (2001), Bisin et al. (2011),






, for some continuous, decreasing, and concave function
w : [0, 1] → R. This summarizes conformism.
Suppose that ν(t′|t) is a cumulative probability distribution determining the
likelihood of an agent with identity t meeting someone with identity t′. We assume
it is continuous and first-order stochastically increasing in t. It captures the idea
that similar minds think alike and players with similar identity are more likely
to meet. Given the distribution of types-actions µ, the within-period payoff of an
agent of an identity t and a social position a is






where µA(·|t′) is the distribution of actions of other players in the population,
conditional on t′. Therefore, payoff of an agent in a single period is the sum of their
idealistic utility and expected payoff to conformity relative to their interactions
with other agents. Our specification implies that the social position can not be
contingent on the social statuses of other agents. It is chosen before any interaction
occurs, highlighting the tension between idealism and conformism.
Following the rule you become whom you pretend to be, we assume that the
social position in a current period has a direct impact on the identity in the
following period. Formally, the transition is governed by cumulative probability
distribution q(t′|a) that determines the likelihood of the agent acquiring identity
t′ in the next period following their choice of a at the current date. We assume
that function a → q(·|a) is continuous and stochastically increasing in a.
The above game admits the greatest (and the least) MSNDE. Indeed, function
r satisfies conditions (i), (ii) and (iv), (v) from Assumption 2. Moreover, since the
transition kernel q depends only on a, it satisfies Assumption 3. Finally, as long
as functions a, a are continuous, in addition to the previously stated assumptions,




is continuous, compact-valued, and satisfies
strong complementarity. Finally, Assumption 1 holds as well.
Apart from equilibrium existence, one can determine equilibrium comparative
transitional dynamics in the model. It is clear that as the initial distribution of
identities τ1 shifts in the first order stochastic sense, the equilibrium pair (µ
∗,Φ∗),
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as well as the entire equilibrium transition path {µ∗n} increase.
It is crucial that the transition function q depends only on action a. Follow-
ing Remark 2, this allows us to dispense of the assumption that function r and
correspondence Ã are increasing in t, which is critical for this application.
4.3 Parenting and endogenous dynastic preferences
We can also apply our tools to dynamic games with short-lived agents, where in-
dividuals make decisions in one period only, but their actions propel dynamics for
future generations. This example is inspired by the literature on paternalistic be-
quests, keeping-up-with-the-Joneses, and growth with endogenous preferences.40
Consider a society populated with a measure space of single-parent single-child
families. Each individual (a parent) lives for a single period and a parent-child
sequence forms a dynasty. The type of a parent is determined by their lifetime
income y ∈ [0, 1] and a parameter i ∈ [0, 1] that summarizes preferences of the
individual toward consumption, in a way that will be explained shortly. Therefore,
in this setting, the types t = (y, i) belong to T = [0, 1]2.
Each period, the income can be devoted to consumption c and investment
(savings) s, thus, imposing the constraint y = c+s for each dynasty. Consumption
yields immediate utility u(c, g), where the parameter g represents propensity to
consume. We assume that the function u is continuous and concave in c, and has
increasing differences in (c, g). That is, the marginal utility of consumption for
the current generation increases with g. Below, we specify how the variable g is
related to the preference for consumption determined by the type i.
We assume paternalistic preferences, i.e., the parent evaluates the well-being
of their child with a function w(t′, τ ′), where t′ = (y′, i′) is the the future type
of the child, and τ ′ is a distribution of types in the next period. We assume w
is increasing in t = (y, i), thus, the parent values high income and preference
for consumption of the child. Since the parent cares only about their immediate
descendant, they want the child to consume as much as possible. Moreover, let w
40 See Cole et al. (1992), Doepke and Zilibotti (2017), and Genicot and Ray (2017).
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have increasing differences in (t′, τ ′), i.e., the higher is the future distribution of
types, the higher is the parent’s incremental benefit of the child’s type.
Each parent devotes (e.g., educational) effort e ∈ E = [0, 1] to shape prefer-
ences of their child (i.e., raise their aspiration level). The cost of effort is given
by C(e, µE), where µE denotes the distribution of efforts in the population. We
assume that the cost function is continuous and increasing with e, and has de-
creasing differences in (e, µE) — the higher effort in the entire population, the
easier it is for an individual to influence their child.
Given our description, the action of an individual is a = (s, e) ∈ A := [0, 1]2.
Savings s and effort e affect both the future income and preferences of the child.
Let the cumulative distribution q(t′|a) determine the probability of the future
type of the child being t′ = (y′, i′), where q is stochastically increasing in both
arguments and is stochastically supermodular in a. Thus, investment s and effort
e are complements. Indeed, from the parent’s perspective higher effort (that skews
preference of the child towards consumption) makes marginal investment/bequest
more valuable. The more future income of the child is devoted to consumption,
the more it pleases the paternalistic parent.
Finally, the marginal propensity to consume g is generated endogenously for
each individual via keeping-up-with-the-Joneses effect. Formally, let g = θΓ(t, µC),
for some positive parameter θ and an increasing function Γ, that depends both
on the type t = (y, i) of the player and the distribution µC over the current
consumption levels in the population. For example,
Γ(t, µC) := inf
{
c ∈ [0, 1] : i ≤ µC(c′′ ≤ c
)}
, (10)
where t = (y, i). That is, Γ is the i’th quantile of consumption in the population.41
Given our description, the objective of a parent of type t = (y, i) is to maximize
u
(









q(dt′|s, e) − C(e, µE),
41 This model is broadly related to Echenique and Komunjer (2009) and Doepke et al. (2019)
concerning endogenous transmission of preferences in dynastic models of a household. Our model
with quantile aspiration preferences and paternalism could be extended to altruistic dynastic
choice, peer effects, or locational concerns as in Agostinelli et al. (2020).
30
with respect to (s, e) ∈ Ã(t, τ) = [0, y] × [0, 1]. Here, the mapping ΦT (µ) is the
projected next-period distribution of types in the population. Notice that w is not
the value function as discussed in Section 2; rather, it is a paternalistic evaluation
of the child’s welfare that may be misaligned with preferences of the child.
To verify whether assumptions of our theorems are satisfied, consider an in-
creasing Markov strategy: σ : T → A, with σs and σe being its projections
on both coordinates. Then, we have µC(Z) = τ
(





{t : σe(t) ∈ Z}
)








measurable set Z. Pointwise higher strategies σ imply a first order stochastic
dominance increase of µE and ΦT (µ), but a first order stochastic dominance de-
crease in µC .
42 Increasing differences of u(c, g), w(t′, τ ′), and −C(e, µE), together
with assumptions on q suffice to show that it is optimal to play a strategy that is
increasing in their private type. This suffices to show that there exist the greatest
MSNDE (µ∗,Φ∗), which can be approximated using successive iterations.
When considering ordered changes in the deep parameters of the model, we
can apply our equilibrium comparative transitional dynamics and equilibrium ap-
proximation to these types of models. In particular, one can show the greatest
(and the least) MSNDE are decreasing with respect to the parameter θ. These
observations are true even though the payoff function is not necessarily increasing
in t, nor it has increasing differences in (t, µ). In fact, whenever function Γ is
specified as in (10), the latter does not hold. Since the additional assumptions
are required to show the particular properties of the value function in the infinite






















any measurable and increasing function f : [0, 1] → R, where σ′s pointwise dominates σs.
31
4.4 Dynamic contests with coordination failures and learn-
ing
Consider a prototypical coordination game based on Angeletos and Lian (2016),
with applications to beauty contests, bank runs, riot games, or currency attacks.43
Here, we focus on a simple dynamic beauty contest. In this large dynamic game,
each player receives a private signal t and chooses an action a every period. Action
is costly and the cost depends on the type t, which is summarized in the utility
function u(t, a), where u is increasing in t and has increasing differences in (t, a).
In addition, the player’s payoff depends on actions taken by other players, say∫
A
g(a, ã)µA(dã), where the function g has increasing differences in (a, ã).
As is standard in global games and dynamic coordination games with comple-
mentarities, we focus on monotone equilibria in which players use an increasing
strategy σ : T → A. The one-period payoff of an agent playing a is








Such payoff satisfies assumptions required by Theorem 1, and so there exists the
greatest MSNDE, where each player is using an increasing strategy σ.44
The framework can be applied to dynamic riot games with private types, where
r(t, a, µ) := a
[∫
S
(t1 + L)1{R(µ)≥s̃}ν(ds̃) − L
]
− c(a, t2),
for some player type by t = (t1, t2) and a compact interval S ⊆ R. Thus, taking
the risky action a = 1 allows the player to “win” t1 if a sufficient number R(µ) :=
µ
(
{(t, a) : a = 1}
)
of players takes a risky (and costly) action, or loose L otherwise.
The strength s of the police is distributed according to some measure ν. Whenever
the cost function is decreasing in t2 and c(0, t2) = 0 (due to normalization), the
dynamic game can be solved for a general transition functions q(·|t, a, µ), thus,
allowing to model inertia, habit formation, or dynamic social externalities. See
also Morris and Yildiz (2016) applications.
43 See Morris and Shin (2002) for an extensive discussion of this literature. See also Carmona
et al. (2017) for an application of mean-field methods to a related class of games.
44 We may dispense monotonicity of u with respect to t as long as the transition function q
depends only on one-dimensional action a.
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4.5 Idiosyncratic risk under multidimensional production
externalities and technological dynamics
Our model can be applied to analyze dynamics of technological progress in large
economies where agents face uninsurable private productivity risk. This includes
the model of Romer (1986) in a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari type setting with ex-ante
identical agents and ex-post heterogeneity in production and no borrowing.45
The economy is populated with a measure space of producers, each endowed
with capital t ∈ T = [0, 1], one unit of time, and a private technology f . The tech-
nology transforms private inputs into finished outputs. Moreover, its productivity
depends on economy-wide externality summarized by the distribution of capital
and labor in the economy. Specifically, each agent with t units of capital and
expending l ∈ L = [0, 1] units of time is able to produce y = f(t, l, µT×L) units of
the finished output, where µT×L is the distribution of capital-labor levels in the
population. We assume that the production function f is continuous and increas-
ing with respect to all arguments, and has increasing differences in (t, l), in (t, µ),
and (l, µ).46 In particular, the private technologies endowed to each agent need
not be convex. In addition, our reduced form of technology allows for nontriv-
ial interactions with market leaders, closely related companies, or a competitive
fringe in both capital and labor dimensions.
The output can be devoted to consumption c or investment i, hence, c+ i = y.
When c units of the output are consumed and labor supply is l, the agent receives
utility U(c, l) = u(c) + v(1 − l), where u, v : R → R are smooth, concave and
strictly increasing. Whenever i ∈ I := [0, 1] units of the good is invested, the
capital in the next period is determined stochastically with q(·|i).47
To preserve complementarity structure to the value functions, we require some
known complementarity conditions for joint monotone controls (see Hopenhayn
45 See also Angeletos and Calvet (2005) for a related study.
46 For example, function f(t, l, µT×L) :=
∫
T×L g(t, l, t̃, l̃)µT×L(dt̃ × dl̃) would satisfy such
conditions as long as g is supermodular in all arguments jointly.
47 Our methods allow to analyze two sector economies. A consumption good sector with
technology f and investment good sector with stochastic technology q(·|t, i, l, µT×L). In the
example we consider a simple version of q depending on investment i only.
33
and Prescott, 1992 and Mirman et al., 2008). Along those lines, we assume
the standard condition −u′′/u′ ≤ f ′′12/(f ′1f ′2). It requires that degree of com-
plementarity between private capital and labor is high relatively to the curva-
ture of the utility function. This suffices for payoffs to have increasing differ-
ences in (t, l). To guarantee increasing differences in (t, µT×L), we require that
u′
(
f(t, l, µT×L) − c
)
f ′1(t, l, µT×L) is increasing in µT×L.
48 Analogous conditions
guarantee increasing differences in (l, µT×L).
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The above conditions are sufficient for Theorem 1 to hold. Therefore, there
exist extremal MSNDEs for this large dynamic non-market economy (interpreted
as a large anonymous game). Moreover, the extremal equilibria can be approx-
imated using iterative methods. This example highlights the difference between
our results and those in the existing literature. Specifically, we consider Markov
stationary transitional dynamics and comparative dynamics results (in additional
to comparative statics of the steady-state). For example, Acemoglu and Jensen
(2015) discuss stochastic steady-state equilibria and the corresponding compar-
ative statics given single dimensional aggregates that summarize production ex-
ternalities.50 Our conditions on the primitives, that guarantee that each player’s
value function has increasing differences in (t, µ), are not crucial for their results.
4.6 OLG Bewley models
As assumed in Assumption 2 and pointed out in the discussion, our main result
requires that the within-period payoff function r has increasing differences in the
private type t and the measure µ. This condition implies that the value function v
48 Whenever the externality can be summarized with some increasing aggregate G(µT×L) ∈ R,




, the condition can be reduced to −u′′/u′ ≤ f ′′13/(f ′1f ′3).
49 Notice that, in our setting, the correspondence A(t, l, µT×L) =
[
0, f(t, l, µT×L)
]
×L does not
have strict complementarities. To assure that the value function v∗ in (3) preserves increasing
differences in (t, µ) we need to use constructions of Mirman et al. (2008) (Lemmas 11, 12 and
Theorems 3, 4). They state assumptions on u, v, and f under which the value function has
increasing differences in (t, µ). This example is useful to compare our results with the results
of Acemoglu and Jensen (2015). We require increasing differences between controls and the
aggregate distribution of assets to obtain the comparative statics of the extremal MSNDEs.
50Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) identify positive shocks for a steady-state equilibrium. To
preserve increasing differences between individual states and shock parameters more assumptions
are needed than noted in their Lemma 1.
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corresponding to the decision problem of each player has increasing differences in
(t, µ) and, as a result, the equilibrium transition function Φ∗ is increasing over its
domain. Unfortunately, in general, the typical infinite horizon Bewley-Huggett-
Aiyagari models violate this assumption.
For example, let the private type of each consumer in the economy be given
by t = (k, ℓ), where k is the capital/asset endowment and ℓ is a random labor
productivity draw. Each period, the agent can consume c or invest (save) a ≥ 0
in the future capital, subject to the budget constraint c + a = ρ(K)k + w(K)ℓ,
where ρ(K) and w(K) denote the interest rate and the wage, respectively, that
depend on the aggregate level of capital K =
∫
k µK(dk), where µK is the marginal
distribution over private capital levels in the population. The within period utility
of an individual is then given by
r(t, a, µ) = u
(
ρ(K)k + w(K) − aℓ
)
,
for some concave utility u. Whenever the price ρ(K) is a decreasing function, the








. Thus, we can not assure that
the value function corresponding to the dynamic problem has increasing differences
in the investment a and the mean future capital K ′. As a result, the equilibrium
operator Φ∗ need not be monotone and our results do not apply.
However, our methods can be applied to a version of the Diamond OLG model
with idiosyncratic risk.51 Suppose that each period there is a measure space of
representative young born, each endowed with a unit of free time and a (private)
i.i.d. draw of labor productivity ℓ. Each old is endowed with a private (saved)







where γ ≥ 0, and c1, c2 denote consumption of the consumer when young and
old, respectively. Each young is supplying a unit of time inelastically and receives
51 Here, we apply our methods to the study of short-lived players, as in Section 4.3.
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where K ′ is the future mean capital. Letting ΦK(µ) be the distribution of cap-







(k). The objective of each player has increasing differences in(
a, w(K)ℓ
)
and (k,K ′), for a decreasing ρ(K) and γ ≥ 1.52 Whenever the func-
tion q is increasing stochastically, the equilibrium transition map Φ is monotone
and, thus, the key condition required for our methods to work is satisfied.
A Appendix
A.1 Mathematical glossary
A.1.1 Lattices and supermodularity
Posets, lattices, and chains A partial order ≥X over a set X is a reflexive,
transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation. A partially ordered set, or a poset,
is a pair (X,≥X) consisting of a set X and a partial order ≥X . When it causes
no confusion, we denote (X,≥X) with X.
For any x, x′ ∈ X, their infimum (the greatest lower bound) is denoted by
x ∧ x′, and their supremum (the least upper bound) by x ∨ x′. The poset X is
a lattice if for any x, x′ ∈ X both x ∧ x′ and x ∨ x′ belong to X. Set A is a
sublattice of X if A ⊆ X and it is a lattice with the induced order, where x ∧ x′
and x ∨ x′ are defined with ≥X . A principle example of a lattice is the Euclidean
space (Rℓ,≥) endowed with the natural product order ≥, where x′ ≥ x if x′i ≥ xi,
for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ. In this case, x∧x′ and x∨x′ are given by (x∧x′)i = min{xi, x′i}
and (x ∨ x′)i = max{xi, x′i}, for all i = 1, . . . , ℓ.
52 Preferences need not be power utility for our methods to be applied. For example, if the
lifetime preferences for the newly born young are given by: U(c1, c2) = u(c1) + βv(c2), where u
continuous, concave and v is C 2, then cv
′′(c)
v′(c) ≥ 1 will suffice. Critically, we require “income effect
dominance” in interest rates, which is a type of “gross complements” condition, which induces
increasing differences between individual investment choices and the distribution of assets.
36





A, respectively. That is,
∨
A is the least element in X such that∨










X for any A ⊆ X. We define a complete sublattice analogously.
A chain is a totally ordered poset, i.e., all of its elements are ordered. A poset
X is (countably) lower chain complete if any (countable) chain A ⊆ X has its
infimum in X. The poset is (countably) upper chain complete if any such chain
has its supremum in X. The poset is (countably) chain complete if it is both
upper and lower (countably) chain complete.
Let (△,⪰) be a space of probability distributions over a compact subset of
S ⊂ Rn, endowed with the first order stochastic ordering ⪰. That is, for any two





f(y)ν(dy), for any measurable, bounded function f : S → R
that increases over S with respect to the corresponding ordering. In particular,
(△,⪰) is a poset (see Kamae et al., 1977) but is not a lattice, unless S is a subset
of R. However, (△,⪰) is chain complete (see Lemma 2 in Balbus et al., 2015a).
Supermodularity Suppose that X is a lattice. A function f : X → R is
supermodular in x, if f(x ∧ x′) + f(x ∨ x′) ≥ f(x) + f(x′), for any x, x′ ∈ X.
Suppose that X is a lattice and △ is a space of probability distributions over
a measurable poset S. The function q : X → △, taking values q(·|x) ∈ △, is




modular in x, for any measurable, bounded, and increasing function u : S → R.
Increasing differences For arbitrary posets X and T , function f : X × T → R
has increasing differences in (x, t) if, for any x′ ≥X x and t′ ≥T t, we have
f(x′, t′) − f(x, t′) ≥ f(x′, t) − f(x, t).




u(s)q(ds|x, t) has increasing differences in (x, t), for any measurable,
bounded, and increasing function u : S → R.
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Monotone correspondences Let X be a poset and Y be an arbitrary set. The
correspondence Γ : X ⇒ Y is increasing with respect to set inclusion if x′ ≥X x
implies Γ(x) ⊆ Γ(x′).
For any poset X and a lattice Y , the correspondence Γ : X ⇒ Y is increasing
with respect to the strong set order if, for any x′ ≥X x and y ∈ Γ(x), y′ ∈ Γ(x′),
we have y ∧ y′ ∈ Γ(x) and y ∨ y′ ∈ Γ(x′).
For any posets X, Z and a lattice Y , the correspondence Γ : X × Z ⇒ Y
satisfies strict complementarities if for any x′ ≥X x, z′ ≥Z z, y ∈ Γ(x, z′), and
y′ ∈ Γ(x′, z), we have y ∧ y′ ∈ Γ(x, z) and y ∨ y′ ∈ Γ(x′, z′). The following lemma
is a generalization of Lemma 1 in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992).
Lemma A.1. Take any posets X, Z and a lattice Y . Endow X × Z with a
product order. If function f : Y ×X × Z → R, taking values f(y, x, z), is su-




and (x, z), and the cor-
respondence Γ : X × Z ⇒ Y satisfies strict complementarities, then g(x, z) :=
supy∈Γ(x,z) f(y, x, z) has increasing differences in (x, z).
Proof. Take any x′ ≥X x, z′ ≥Y z, and y ∈ Γ(x, z′), y′ ∈ Γ(x′, z). Then,
g(x, z) + g(x′, z′) ≥ f(y ∧ y′, x, z) + f(y ∨ y′, x′, z′)
= f(y ∧ y′, x, z) − f(y ∧ y′, x, z′) + f(y ∨ y′, x′, z′) + f(y ∧ y′, x, z′)
≥ f(y ∧ y′, x, z) − f(y ∧ y′, x, z′) + f(y, x, z′) + f(y′, x′, z′),
where the first inequality follows from the definition of g and strict complemen-
tarity of Γ, and the second is implied by the fact that
f(y ∧ y′, x, z′) + f(y ∨ y′, x′, z′)
=
[












f(y, x′, z′) − f(y, x, z′)
]
= f(y, x, z′) + f(y′, x′, z′),





(the second bracket). Thus,
g(x, z) + g(x′, z′) ≥ f(y ∧ y′, x, z) − f(y ∧ y′, x, z′)
+ f(y, x, z′) + f(y′, x′, z′) + f(y′, x′, z) − f(y′, x′, z)
= f(y, x, z′) + f(y′, x′, z) +
[




f(y′, x′, z) − f(y ∧ y′, x, z)
]
≥ f(y, x, z′) + f(y′, x′, z),









conclude by taking the supremum over the right-hand side of this inequality.
Monotone comparative statics Theorem 6.1 in Topkis (1978) states that for
any lattice X and a poset Y , if the correspondence Γ : Y → X increases in the
strong set order and a function f : X × Y → R is supermodular in x and has
increasing differences in (x, y), then the correspondence y ⇒ arg maxx∈Γ(y) f(x, y)
is sublattice-valued and increasing in the strong set order. Moreover, if f is
continuous and Γ is compact-valued, then the above correspondence is compact-
valued and admits the greatest and the least selection, both increasing in y. See
Theorem 6.2 in Topkis (1978).
Fixed points We present two theorems that are critical for proving Theorems 1
and 2. Given posets X and Y , a function f : X → Y is increasing if x′ ≥X x
implies f(x′) ≥Y f(x). Below, we generalize Theorem 9 in Markowsky (1976).
Proposition A.1. Let (X,≥X) be a lower chain complete poset with the greatest
element. The set of fixed points of an increasing function f : X → X is a
nonempty lower chain complete poset. Moreover, its greatest fixed point exists
and is given by
∨{
x ∈ X : f(x) ≥X x
}
.54





then f(y′, x′, z′) − f(y, x′, z′) ≥ f(y′, x′, z) − f(y, x′, z), which is equivalent to
f(y′, x′, z′) − f(y′, x′, z) ≥ f(y, x′, z′) − f(y, x′, z). Given that f has increasing differences in
(x, z), we have f(y, x′, z′)− f(y, x′, z) ≥ f(y, x, z′)− f(y, x, z). Combining the two inequalities
yields f(y′, x′, z′)− f(y, x, z′) ≥ f(y′, x′, z)− f(y, x, z).
54 There is an obvious order dual to this result for increasing functions defined on an upper
chain complete domain X that implies existence of the least fixed point theorem.
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Proof. Let x̄ be the greatest element of X. Let I be a set of ordinal numbers
with cardinality strictly greater than X. Define the following transfinite sequence
with the initial element x0 = x̄ and xi =
∧{
f(xj) : j < i
}
, for i ∈ I \ {0}. We
claim that {xi} is a well-defined decreasing sequence. Clearly x1 = f(x0) ≤ x0.





is a decreasing sequence, that has an infimum equal to xi. Consequently xj is well
defined and decreasing on [0, i]. By transfinite induction, the transfinite sequence
{xi}i∈I is well defined and decreasing. Since I has the cardinality strictly greater
than X, there is no one-to-one mapping between I and X. Consequently, take
the least element ī in {i ∈ I : xi = xi+1}. Then xī = xī+1 = f(xī), and
e∗ := xī is a fixed point of f . To show that e
∗ =
∨{





x ∈ X : f(x) ≥ x
}
. Obviously, we have e∗ ∈ X . For any other y ∈ X , we
have y ≤ x0. Suppose there is i ∈ I such that y ≤ xj, for any j < i. Since y ∈ X ,
by transfinite induction, we have y ≤ f(y) ≤ f(xj). Thus, y ≤
∧{
f(xj) : j ≤ i
}
and y ≤ xi, for any i ∈ I , including ī.
Given posets X and Y , function f : X → Y is monotone sup-preserving if,

















k∈N, for any decreasing
sequence {xk}k∈N. Below we extend the classic comparative statics results of
Veinott (1992) and Topkis (1998) to countably chain complete posets. The result
is an extension of the Tarski-Kantorovich theorem. See Balbus et al. (2015c).55
Proposition A.2. Let X be a lower countably chain complete poset with the
greatest element
∨
X, and let Θ be a poset. For any function f : X × Θ → X
and θ ∈ Θ such that f(·, θ) is increasing and monotone inf-preserving over X,







56 In addition, if
f is increasing in the product order and f(·, θ) is monotone inf-preserving, for all
θ ∈ Θ, then the greatest fixed point is increasing over Θ.
55 There is a dual version of this theorem for the least fixed point of the monotone sup-
preserving function defined over an upper countably chain complete domain X.
56 By fn we denote the n’th composition of f , i.e., fn = f ◦ f ◦ . . . ◦ f (n times).
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We now discuss relations between order convergence in M and weak conver-
gence of measures.
Remark A.1. As in the main section, let M be a set of probability measures
over compact subsets of Rn endowed with the first order stochastic dominance
relation ⪰. Since we operate on sequences that are either increasing or decreasing,
the supremum or infimum in M is the limit not only in the (interval) topology
generated by open intervals, but also in the weak topology on M (see Hopenhayn
and Prescott, 1992, pp 1389–1391). That is, if {µn} is a first order stochastically
increasing sequence with the supremum µ, then
lim
n→∞




where the limit on the left is defined in the sense of weak convergence on M, and
the supremum on the right is defined with respect to (M,⪰). The same applies
to the mappings Φ ∈ D. Recall that D includes inf-preserving mappings from M
to itself. In fact, a weakly continuous self-map on M is sup-inf preserving, but
the converse does not hold.
A.1.2 The exact law of large numbers
Super-atomless probability space Let (Λ,L, λ) be a probability space. For
any E ∈ L such that λ(E) > 0, let LE :=
{
E ∩ E ′ : E ′ ∈ L
}
and λE be the re-
scaled measure from the restriction of λ to LE. Let LEλ be the set of equivalence
classes of sets in LE such that λE(E1△E2) = 0, for E1, E2 ∈ LE.57 We endow the
space with metric dE : LEλ × LEλ → R given by dE(E1, E2) := λE(E1△E2).
Definition A.1 (Super-atomless space). A probability space (Λ,L, λ) is super-
atomless if for any E ∈ L with λ(E) > 0, the space (LEλ , dE) is non-separable.58
As shown by Podczeck (2009), any atomless Borel probability measure on a
Polish space can be extended to a super-atomless probability measure.
57 We denote E1△E2 := (E1 \ E2) ∪ (E2 \ E1).
58 This definition is by Podczeck (2009, 2010). Equivalenlty, Hoover and Keisler (1984) and
Keisler and Sun (2009) dub such spaces ℵ1-atomless and rich, respectively.
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Fubini extension For any set Ω and E ⊆ (Λ × Ω), we denote its sections by
Eα :=
{




α ∈ Λ : (α, ω) ∈ E
}
, for any α ∈ Λ and
ω ∈ Ω. Similarly, for any function f defined over λ× Ω, let fα and fω denote the
section of f for a fixed α, ω, respectively. Consider the following definition.
Definition A.2 (Fubini extension). The probability space (Λ×Ω,L⊠F , λ⊠P )
is a Fubini extension of the natural product of probability spaces (Λ,L, λ) and
(Ω,F , P ) if: (i) L⊠ F includes all sets from L ⊗ F ; and (ii) for an arbitrary set
E ∈ L⊠F and (λ⊗ P )-almost every (α, ω) ∈ Λ × Ω, the sections Eα and Eω are
F - and L-measurable, respectively, while







Given a probability space (Λ,L, λ), a collection of random variables (Xα)α∈Λ
is essentially pairwise independent, if for (λ ⊗ λ)-almost every (α, α′) ∈ Λ × Λ,
random variables Xα and Xα′ are independent. A Fubini extension is rich, if
there is a (L ⊠ F)-measurable function X : Λ × Ω → R such that the random
variables (Xα)α∈Λ are essentially pairwise independent and the random variable
Xα has the uniform distribution over [0, 1], for λ-almost every α ∈ Λ. Podczeck
(2010) shows that there exists a rich Fubini extension if and only if the space is
super-atomless. Moreover, without loss, one may assume the random variables
(Xα)α∈Λ to be independent, rather than pairwise-independent.
The (exact) Law of Large Numbers A process is a (L ⊠ F)-measurable
function with values in a Polish space. For any process f and set E ∈ L such that
λ(E) > 0, we denote the restriction of f to E × Ω by fE. Naturally, LE ⊠ F :={
W ∈ L⊠F : W ⊆ E×Ω
}
and (λE ⊠P ) is a probability measure re-scaled from
the restriction of (λ⊠ P ) to (LE ⊠ F). The following is due to Sun (2006).
Proposition A.3 (Law of Large Numbers). Let f be a process from a rich Fubini
extension (Λ × Ω,L⊠ F , λ⊠ P ) to some Polish space. Then, for all E ∈ L such
that λ(E) > 0 and P -almost every ω ∈ Ω, we have λ(fEω )−1 = (λE ⊠ P )(fE)−1.
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An iterative application of this proposition and universality of the rich Fubini
extension imply the exact law of large numbers for the dynamic transition in





Then, there exists an implied probability measure µ∞ on (T ×A)∞. Any random
variable h taking values in (T×A)∞ with distribution µ∞ is a Markov process with
state space T ×A, initial distribution µ0 and transition probability q(t, a, µn) from
time n to time n + 1. Sun’s result on the universality of a rich Fubini extension
on Λ × Ω says that there is an essentially pairwise independent process F from
Λ × Ω to (T × A)∞ such that for each α ∈ Λ, Fα has the same distribution µ∞.
Then, Sun’s ELLN says that, for a.e. ω, Fω has the same distribution µ
∞, which
means that the type-action distribution in the n-th period for all the agents is µn.
See a related construction derived for a class of Bewley models by Cao (2020).
A.2 Proofs
We begin with a few ancillary results.
Lemma A.2. Let (Ξ,≥) be a poset with its order topology, and {fk} be a sequence
of increasing and monotone inf-preserving functions fk : Ξ → R. Whenever xk ↓ x
in Ξ and fk ↓ f (pointwise), then fk(xk) → f(x).
Proof. Let n ∈ N. Since {fk} is a decreasing sequence of increasing functions
and xk ↓ x, then k ≥ n implies f(x) ≤ fk(xk) ≤ fk(xn). Thus, we have f(x) ≤
lim infk→∞ fk(xk) ≤ lim supk→∞ fk(xk) ≤ f(xn). To conclude, let n → ∞.
Lemma A.3. Let {νk} be a sequence of probability measures on a Polish space S,
and {hk} be a sequence of bounded, measurable functions hk : S → R. If νk ↓ ν





Proof. It is a consequence of Lemma A.2, where Ξ is a space of bounded, measur-
able, real valued functions on S, and fk(x) :=
∫
S
x(s)νk(ds), xk(s) = hk(s).
59 We thank the anonymous Referee for suggesting this proof of the dynamic version of ELLN.
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Lemma A.4. Let S1, S2 be topological spaces and f : S1×S2 7→ R be a continuous
function. Let Γ : S1 ⇒ S2 be a continuous and compact-valued correspondence,
and define Γ∗(x) := arg max
y∈Γ(x)
f(x, y). If xk → x in S1, yk → y in S2, and
yk ∈ Γ∗(xk), then y ∈ Γ∗(x).
Proof. Let y′ ∈ Γ(x). By continuity of Γ, for any k ∈ N, there is y′k ∈ Γ(xk) such
that y′k → y′. Since yk ∈ Γ∗(xk), we have f(xk, yk) ≥ f(xk, y′k), for all k ∈ N. By
continuity of f , this implies that f(x, y) ≥ f(x, y′). Since y′ ∈ Γ(x) is arbitrary,
we have y ∈ Γ∗(x).
We proceed with the proofs that were omitted in the main paper.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider vn ∈ V , for all n ∈ N, and vn → v. Let (µk) and
(Φk) be a collection of decreasing sequences in M and D, respectively, such that
µk → µ (weakly) and Φk → Φ (pointwise). Take any t ∈ T and ϵ > 0. There is
n0 ∈ N such that, for all k ∈ N and n ≥ n0, we have
|v(t, µk,Φk)−v(t, µ,Φ)| ≤ |v(t, µk,Φk)−vn(t, µk,Φk)|+|vn(t, µk,Φk)−vn(t, µ,Φ)|
+ |vn(t, µ,Φ) − v(t, µ,Φ)| ≤
2
3
ϵ + |vn(t, µk,Φk) − vn(t, µ,Φ)| (11)
Take any n ∈ N satisfying (11). Since vn ∈ V , for large enough k, we have∣∣vn(t, µk,Φn) − vn(t, µ,Φ)∣∣ ≤ ϵ/3. Given (11), |v(t, µk,Φk) − v(t, µ,Φ)| < ϵ, for a
large k. Hence, v is monotonically sup- and inf-preserving. Thus, v ∈ V . □
Continuation of the proof to Lemma 4. We prove (vi). Using Assumption
2, definition of V , and Lemma A.4, one can show that F is a Carathéodory func-
tion in (t, a), i.e., measurable in t and continuous in a. Hence, by Assumption 1
and Measurable Maximum Theorem (Theorem 18.19 in Aliprantis and Border,
2006) the correspondence Γ(t, µ; v,Φ) is measurable in t, hence, weakly measur-
able.60 For each j = 1, 2, . . . , k, the function πj(t) := maxa∈Γ(t,µ;v,Φ) aj is measur-
able (again, by the Measurable Maximum Theorem). Thus, t → γ(t, µ,Φ; v) =(
π1(t), π2(t), . . . , πk(t)
)
is measurable. □
60See, e.g., Lemma 18.2 in Aliprantis and Border (2006).
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